Archive for espionage

Iran: mosque blast bears ‘US, Israeli thumbprints’

Posted in Media Watch with tags , , , on June 1, 2009 by The 800 Pound Gorilla

barghi20090529173603703 (Custom)Press TV (Iran)
May 29, 2009

A senior Iranian official says Israel and the US have had a hand in the mosque bombing that shook the southeastern city of Zahedan to its core.

“The bomb tragedy that occurred yesterday in the city of Zahedan is awash with Israeli and US fingerprints,” said Tehran’s Interim Friday Prayers Leader, Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami.

“Without a doubt, it was a scheme to drive a wedge between the Shia population and the Sunni minority in Iran,” he added.

Ayatollah Khatami said that the perpetrators of the bomb attack have been identified and will be brought to justice.

At least 25 people were killed and 125 others were injured on Thursday after bombers targeted a religious ceremony in the Shia Amir al-Momenin mosque.

The mosque was partially destroyed by the blast.

Jalal Sayah, deputy provincial governor of the Sistan-Baluchistan province that borders Pakistan and Afghanistan, said Friday that at least three people have been arrested with regards to the terrorist attacks.

“According to the information obtained they planted the bomb at the behest of the United States and its allies,” Sayah said.

The above article can be found at: Iran mosque blast bears ‘US, Israel thumbprints’

DUAL-LOYALTY WATCH: Another Israeli spy goes scot-free; case ‘shrouded in mystery,’ says judge

Posted in Israel with tags , , , , on June 1, 2009 by The 800 Pound Gorilla

Ben-Ami_Kadish_CU.S. man who gave secrets to Israel spared prison

May 29, 2009

NEW YORK — An 85-year-old former civilian employee of the U.S. Army was fined but avoided prison time on Friday after earlier pleading guilty to giving classified documents to Israel in the 1980s in a case the sentencing judge said was “shrouded in mystery.”

Court documents showed that Ben-Ami Kadish, who was fined $50,000 but spared prison time, reported to the same handler as Jonathan Pollard, an American who spied for Israel in the 1980s and triggered a scandal that rocked U.S.-Israeli relations.

“Why it took the government 23 years to charge Mr. Kadish is shrouded in mystery,” U.S. District Judge William Pauley said during the sentencing hearing in Manhattan federal court. “It is clear the (U.S.) government could have charged Mr. Kadish with far more serious crimes.”

Kadish pleaded guilty in December to acting as an unregistered agent of Israel. He was arrested in April 2008 on four counts of conspiracy and espionage. The spying charge, dropped under a plea deal, had carried a possible death sentence.

“I am sorry I made a mistake,” a frail-looking Kadish said during the sentencing hearing. “I thought I was helping the state of Israel without harming the United States.”

The judge said he gave a lenient sentence due to Kadish’s age and infirmity, but said Kadish had committed “a grave offense” and had “abused the trust” of the United States. For much of the hearing, Kadish sat slumped in his chair with heavy eyelids. At one stage, he had to be shaken awake by his lawyer.


Prosecutors had recommended no prison time as part of the plea deal. They said between 1980 and 1985 Kadish provided classified documents, including some relating to U.S. missile defense systems, to an Israeli agent, Yosef Yagur, who photographed the documents at Kadish’s residence.

Yagur also was Pollard’s main Israeli contact. Pollard, a former U.S. Navy intelligence analyst, is serving a life sentence after pleading guilty to spying for Israel in 1986. Israel gave Pollard citizenship in 1996 and acknowledged he was one of its spies in 1998.

During the hearing, the judge questioned a prosecutor as to why it took so long to charge Kadish when the telephone records on which the case was based were available in the mid-1980s.

“There is no mystery behind it, it’s just what happened,” said prosecutor Iris Lan, who explained she understood it took the FBI that amount of time to assemble the evidence.

The judge also questioned Kadish’s lawyer about how Kadish was able to earn $104,000 in 2007 when he does not work. His lawyer said it was from investments.

Kadish was born in the United States but grew up on a farm in Palestine before the founding of the modern state of Israel. He served in the British and U.S. armies in World War II.

From 1980 to 1985, Yagur asked Kadish to obtain classified documents, which Kadish retrieved from the U.S. Army’s Picatinny Arsenal in Dover, New Jersey, according to a sworn statement by Kadish. Kadish said he kept up a friendship with Yagur after 1985.

“While Kadish knew he was aiding Israel, an ally to the United States, he also knew his crime compromised the national security,” the judge said.

The above article can be found at:

NYT: Israeli spy in Lebanon is cousin of alleged 9/11 hijacker

Posted in Mossad's 9/11 with tags , , , , on May 13, 2009 by The 800 Pound Gorilla

spy2002Lebanese in Shock over Arrest of an Accused Spy
The New York Times

February 19, 2009

MARAJ, Lebanon — For 25 years, Ali al-Jarrah [cousin of alleged 9/11 hijacker Ziad al-Jarrah] managed to live on both sides of the bitterest divide running through this region. To friends and neighbors, he was an earnest supporter of the Palestinian cause, an affable, white-haired family man who worked as an administrator at a nearby school.

To Israel, he appears to have been a valued spy, sending reports and taking clandestine photographs of Palestinian groups and Hezbollah since 1983.

Now he sits in a Lebanese prison cell, accused by the authorities of betraying his country to an enemy state. Months after his arrest, his friends and former colleagues are still in shock over the extent of his deceptions: the carefully disguised trips abroad, the unexplained cash, the secret second wife.

Lebanese investigators say he has confessed to a career of espionage spectacular in its scope and longevity, a real-life John le Carre novel. Many intelligence agents are said to operate in the civil chaos of Lebanon, but Mr. Jarrah’s arrest has shed a rare light onto a world of spying and subversion that usually persists in secret.

Mr. Jarrah’s first wife maintains that he was tortured, and is innocent; requests to interview him were denied.

From his home in this Bekaa Valley village, Mr. Jarrah, 50, traveled often to Syria and to south Lebanon, where he photographed roads and convoys that might have been used to transport weapons to Hezbollah, the Shiite militant group, investigators say. He spoke with his handlers by satellite phone, receiving “dead drops” of money, cameras and listening devices. Occasionally, on the pretext of a business trip, he traveled to Belgium and Italy, received an Israeli passport, and flew to Israel, where he was debriefed at length, investigators say.

At the start of the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, Israeli officials called Mr. Jarrah to reassure him that his village would be spared and that he should stay at home, investigators said.

He was finally arrested last July by Hezbollah, which now has perhaps the most powerful intelligence apparatus in this country. It handed him to the Lebanese military — along with his brother Yusuf, who is accused of helping him spy [Is the entire al-Jarrah family involved with Israeli intelligence? — 800] — and he awaits trial by a military court.

Several current and former military officials agreed to provide details about his case on condition of anonymity, saying they were not authorized to discuss it before the trial began. Their accounts tallied with details provided by Mr. Jarrah’s relatives and former colleagues.

It is not the family’s first brush with notoriety. One of Mr. Jarrah’s cousins, Ziad al-Jarrah, was among the 19 hijackers who carried out the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, though the men were 20 years apart in age and do not appear to have known each other well.

Mark Regev, a spokesman for Israel’s prime minister, Ehud Olmert, declined to discuss Mr. Jarrah’s situation, saying, “It is not our practice to publicly talk about any such allegations in this case or in any case.”

Villagers here seemed incredulous that a man they knew all their lives could have taken money to spy for a country that they regard with unmixed hatred and disgust.

Many maintained his innocence. But Raja Mosleh, the Palestinian doctor who was his partner for years in a school and health clinic near here, did not.

“I never suspected him before,” Dr. Mosleh said. “But now, after linking all the incidents together, I feel he’s 100 percent guilty.”

“He used to talk about the Palestinian cause all the time, how he supported the cause, he supported the people, he liked everybody — this son of a dog,” Dr. Mosleh added, his voice thick with contempt.

Mr. Jarrah would often borrow money to buy cigarettes, apparently posing as a man of limited means. Investigators say he received more than $300,000 for his work from Israel.

Only recently did he begin to spend in ways that raised questions. About six years ago, neighbors said, he built a three-story villa with a terra-cotta roof that is by far the grandest house in this modest village of low concrete dwellings. Outside is a small roofed archway and a heavy iron gate, and on a recent day a German shepherd stood guard.

Dr. Mosleh asked him where he got the money, and Mr. Jarrah said he got help from a daughter living in Brazil. It is a natural excuse in Lebanon, where a large portion of the population receives remittances from relatives abroad.

Mr. Jarrah also had a secret second wife, according to investigators and his former colleagues. Unlike his first wife, Maryam Shmouri al-Jarrah, who lived in relative grandeur with their five children in Maraj, the second wife lived in a cheap apartment in the town of Masnaa, near the Syrian border. This apparently allowed Mr. Jarrah to travel near the border in the unremarkable guise of a local working-class man.

Mr. Jarrah has said he was recruited in 1983 — a year after Israel began a major invasion of Lebanon — by Israeli officers who had imprisoned him, according to investigators. He was offered regular payments in exchange for information about Palestinian militants and Syrian troop movements, they said.

After Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, thousands of Lebanese from the occupied zone in the south were tried and sentenced — mostly to light prison terms — for collaborating with Israel.

Far from the border, a different class of collaborators, rooted in their communities, persisted. A few have been caught and sentenced.

Mr. Jarrah’s motives remain a mystery. He said he tried to stop, but the Israelis would not let him, investigators said.

It all came to an end last summer. He went on a trip to Syria in July, and when he returned he said he had been briefly detained by the Syrian police, his first wife said. He seemed very uneasy, not his usual self, she said.

He left the house that night, saying he was going to Beirut, and never returned, Mrs. Jarrah said. Only three months later did she get a call from the Lebanese Army saying it had taken custody of him.

A few weeks ago, Mrs. Jarrah said, she was allowed to see him. He looked terrible, exhausted, she said.

Lebanese security forces released a photograph of Mr. Jarrah, taken before his arrest. In it, he appears against a blue and white backdrop, dressed in a formal dark shirt, wearing an enigmatic smile.
The above article can be found at:

Also, for a 2002 New York Times article that lets slip a further connection between the alleged 9/11 hijackers and Israeli intelligence, see “Nick Berg: Mossad operator with ties to 9/11?”

Six more Israeli ‘spies’ caught in Lebanon

Posted in Israel with tags , , , , on May 7, 2009 by The 800 Pound Gorilla

May 4, 2009

Lebanese authorities have arrested six more people accused of spying for Tel Aviv amid a campaign aimed at curtailing Israel’s intelligence operations in Lebanon.

The latest captures take to 16 the number of suspected Israeli spies arrested since January, an army spokesperson, speaking on condition of anonymity, told AFP.

The arrests include a police officer and his wife who were taken into custody late Sunday. Three others, accused of passing on information to Israel, were detained also on Sunday in the southern the village of Habboush.

The report comes as Lebanese authorities have stepped up efforts to identify and capture those collecting intelligence on Lebanon on behalf of Israel.

In late April, two Lebanese men and a Palestinian confessed to supplying Israeli intelligence agents with information regarding Hezbollah activities.

The men, with alleged links to Israel’s intelligence service Mossad, were exposed during an interrogation of a retired Lebanese general also suspected of spying on behalf of Israel, the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar reported.

The former Lebanese general told interrogators that he had worked for Israel for more than 10 years and regularly met with his Israeli contacts in Europe.

Lebanon, which considers itself at war with Israel, bans its citizens from having any contact with Tel Aviv. Under Lebanese law, death penalty awaits one who is convicted of espionage.

The above article can be found at: Six more Israeli ‘spies’ caught in Lebanon

Israeli cyber-Spies Penetrated Electricity Grid in U.S. and blame it on China & Russia

Posted in Etc. with tags , , , , , , on April 9, 2009 by The 800 Pound Gorilla

going-off-the-grid-1-customElectricity Grid in U.S. Penetrated By Spies
The Wall Street Journal

APRIL 8, 2009

WASHINGTON — Cyberspies have penetrated the U.S. electrical grid and left behind software programs that could be used to disrupt the system, according to current and former national-security officials.

[SAN FRANCISCO (Reuters) — More cyber attacks originate in the United States than in any other country, but the number of attacks that appear to come from Israel is nearly double that of any other nation, according to a study released Monday. (2002)

The study found that power and energy companies were primarily targeted by the Middle East {Israel} while high-tech and financial services companies were targeted by Asian attackers.

Israel, which has produced security software specialists such as Checkpoint and Kavado, produced more cyber attacks per head of population than any other nation, at 26 attacks per 10,000 internet users.

Sources inform Globes that representatives of the R&D department of Chinese communications equipment giant Huawei arrived in Israel this week to examine the possibility of establishing an R&D center in Israel. (2004)]

The spies came from China, Russia and other countries, these officials said, and were believed to be on a mission to navigate the U.S. electrical system and its controls. The intruders haven’t sought to damage the power grid or other key infrastructure, but officials warned they could try during a crisis or war.

“The Chinese have attempted to map our infrastructure, such as the electrical grid,” said a senior intelligence official. “So have the Russians.”

The espionage appeared pervasive across the U.S. and doesn’t target a particular company or region, said a former Department of Homeland Security official. “There are intrusions, and they are growing,” the former official said, referring to electrical systems. “There were a lot last year.”

Many of the intrusions were detected not by the companies in charge of the infrastructure but by U.S. intelligence agencies, officials said. Intelligence officials worry about cyber attackers taking control of electrical facilities, a nuclear power plant or financial networks via the Internet.

Authorities investigating the intrusions have found software tools left behind that could be used to destroy infrastructure components, the senior intelligence official said. He added, “If we go to war with them, they will try to turn them on.”

Officials said water, sewage and other infrastructure systems also were at risk.

“Over the past several years, we have seen cyberattacks against critical infrastructures abroad, and many of our own infrastructures are as vulnerable as their foreign counterparts,” Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair recently told lawmakers. “A number of nations, including Russia and China, can disrupt elements of the U.S. information infrastructure.”

Officials cautioned that the motivation of the cyberspies wasn’t well understood, and they don’t see an immediate danger. China, for example, has little incentive to disrupt the U.S. economy because it relies on American consumers and holds U.S. government debt.

But protecting the electrical grid and other infrastructure is a key part of the Obama administration’s cybersecurity review, which is to be completed next week. Under the Bush administration, Congress approved $17 billion in secret funds to protect government networks, according to people familiar with the budget. The Obama administration is weighing whether to expand the program to address vulnerabilities in private computer networks, which would cost billions of dollars more. A senior Pentagon official said Tuesday the Pentagon has spent $100 million in the past six months repairing cyber damage.

Overseas examples show the potential havoc. In 2000, a disgruntled employee rigged a computerized control system at a water-treatment plant in Australia, releasing more than 200,000 gallons of sewage into parks, rivers and the grounds of a Hyatt hotel.

Last year, a senior Central Intelligence Agency official, Tom Donahue, told a meeting of utility company representatives in New Orleans that a cyberattack had taken out power equipment in multiple regions outside the U.S. The outage was followed with extortion demands, he said.

The U.S. electrical grid comprises three separate electric networks, covering the East, the West and Texas. Each includes many thousands of miles of transmission lines, power plants and substations. The flow of power is controlled by local utilities or regional transmission organizations. The growing reliance of utilities on Internet-based communication has increased the vulnerability of control systems to spies and hackers, according to government reports.

The sophistication of the U.S. intrusions — which extend beyond electric to other key infrastructure systems — suggests that China and Russia are mainly responsible, according to intelligence officials and cybersecurity specialists. While terrorist groups could develop the ability to penetrate U.S. infrastructure, they don’t appear to have yet mounted attacks, these officials say.

It is nearly impossible to know whether or not an attack is government-sponsored because of the difficulty in tracking true identities in cyberspace. U.S. officials said investigators have followed electronic trails of stolen data to China and Russia.

Russian and Chinese officials have denied any wrongdoing. “These are pure speculations,” said Yevgeniy Khorishko, a spokesman at the Russian Embassy. “Russia has nothing to do with the cyberattacks on the U.S. infrastructure, or on any infrastructure in any other country in the world.”

A spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, Wang Baodong, said the Chinese government “resolutely oppose[s] any crime, including hacking, that destroys the Internet or computer network” and has laws barring the practice. China was ready to cooperate with other countries to counter such attacks, he said, and added that “some people overseas with Cold War mentality are indulged in fabricating the sheer lies of the so-called cyberspies in China.”

Utilities are reluctant to speak about the dangers. “Much of what we’ve done, we can’t talk about,” said Ray Dotter, a spokesman at PJM Interconnection LLC, which coordinates the movement of wholesale electricity in 13 states and the District of Columbia. He said the organization has beefed up its security, in conformance with federal standards.

In January 2008, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approved new protection measures that required improvements in the security of computer servers and better plans for handling attacks.

Last week, Senate Democrats introduced a proposal that would require all critical infrastructure companies to meet new cybersecurity standards and grant the president emergency powers over control of the grid systems and other infrastructure.

Specialists at the U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit, a nonprofit research institute, said attack programs search for openings in a network, much as a thief tests locks on doors. Once inside, these programs and their human controllers can acquire the same access and powers as a systems administrator. NERC Letter

The North American Electric Reliability Corporation on Tuesday warned its members that not all of them appear to be adhering to cybersecuirty requirements. Read the letter.

The White House review of cybersecurity programs is studying ways to shield the electrical grid from such attacks, said James Lewis, who directed a study for the Center for Strategic and International Studies and has met with White House reviewers.

The reliability of the grid is ultimately the responsibility of the North American Electric Reliability Corp., an independent standards-setting organization overseen by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

The NERC set standards last year requiring companies to designate “critical cyber assets.” Companies, for example, must check the backgrounds of employees and install firewalls to separate administrative networks from those that control electricity flow. The group will begin auditing compliance in July. —Rebecca Smith contributed to this article.

Corrections & Amplifications
Central Inteligence Agency official Tom Donahue’s last name was misspelled in a previous version of this article.

This article can be found at:

Study: Most cyber attacks originate in U.S., Israel

USA Today
January 28, 2002

SAN FRANCISCO (Reuters) — More cyber attacks originate in the United States than in any other country, but the number of attacks that appear to come from Israel is nearly double that of any other nation, according to a study released Monday.

High-tech, financial services, media/entertainment and power and energy companies showed the highest intensity of attacks per company, each averaging more than 700 attacks per company over the six-month period.

On a percentage basis, most of the attacks were relatively benign in nature. But the number of severe attacks was still substantial, with critical and emergency-level events detected on 43% of the client networks, the study found.

“In fact, our findings strongly suggest that once companies connect their systems to the Internet, they are virtually guaranteed to suffer some form of attack,” the report said.

Average attacks per company increased by nearly 80% over the six months studied.

Israel leads the list of countries in terms of number of computer attacks per 10,000 Internet users, followed by Hong Kong, Thailand, South Korea, France, Turkey, Malaysia, Poland, Taiwan and Denmark, according to the study from Riptech, a firm that provides security monitoring of corporate and other computer networks.

“Israel is a country with pretty sophisticated warfare capabilities,” that spread through the relatively computer-literate general population, said Amit Yoran, president and chief executive of Alexandria, Va.-based Riptech.

For the study, Riptech investigated more than 128,000 cyber attacks found in the analysis of 5.5 billion log entries and alerts on its customer’s networks between July and December. The company has about 300 customers in 25 countries.

While most attacks can be traced back to what is believed to be the source country, it is possible for malicious hackers to hide their exact location, according to Yoran.

The study found that attacks that appeared to originate in the United States — nearly 30% of the total — were nearly triple the second-ranked country. But only about 3.5 attacks were made per 10,000 U.S. Internet users, compared with 26 attacks per 10,000 Internet users in Israel, the study found.

Behind the United States in percentage of total attacks was South Korea, China, Germany, France, Canada, Taiwan, Italy, Great Britain and Japan.

Middle East targets power; Asia targets finance

The study found that power and energy companies were primarily targeted by the Middle East while high-tech and financial services companies were targeted by Asian attackers.

Of particular note was the fact that the Code Red and Nimda worms were so predominant — accounting for about 63% of the malicious activity detected by Riptech — that they were excluded from the study.

“We had to pull them out or they would have completely skewed any type of analysis,” said Yoran. “They were just so prevalent over that six month period.”

Excluding Nimda, attacks dipped during the week following Sept. 11 but began to rise in the third week of September, peaking in the middle of November and declining slightly in early December, according to the study.

Companies with more than 500 employees suffered at least 50% more attacks than smaller companies, while public companies suffered about twice as many attacks as private and non-profit companies.

Thirty-nine percent of the attacks looked targeted, appearing to be deliberate attempts to compromise a specific system or company. “That was just mindboggling to me,” Yoran said.

Yoran said the study was different from most in that it relied on actual attack data rather than surveys of network administrators or other company officials, which Yoran said are not always accurate.

This article can be found at:

China”s Huawei mulling Israel R&D center
Asia Intelligence Wire

October 27, 2004

Sources inform Globes that representatives of the R&D department of Chinese communications equipment giant Huawei arrived in Israel this week to examine the possibility of establishing an R&D center in Israel.

The visit follows Minister of Industry Trade and Labor Ehud Olmert”s visit to China in June. Olmert was accompanied by a business delegation, which met Huawei chief manager Zhang Laifa. Olmert invited Zhang to establish an R&D center in Israel and to attend the Telecom Israel 2004 exhibition in November.

Amiram Halevy-Laher, director of the Asia Pacific division at the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor foreign trade administration, confirmed the report. He said the visit by Huawei R&D representatives and the expected visit by Zhang next month were initial steps for examining the possible establishment of a Huawei R&D center in Israel.

A delegation of Israel high-tech businesspeople and Israeli Industry Center for R&D (MATIMOP) representatives recently visited Shezhen in China, where it established relations with Huawei”s R&D department. Following the meeting in Shenzhen, Huawei”s R&D staff will also meet MATIMOP representatives in Israel.

This article can be found at:

Spy chiefs fear Chinese cyber attack
Times Online

March 29, 2009

INTELLIGENCE chiefs have warned that China may have gained the capability to shut down Britain by crippling its telecoms and utilities.

They have told ministers of their fears that equipment installed by Huawei, the Chinese telecoms giant, in BT’s new communications network could be used to halt critical services such as power, food and water supplies.

The warnings coincide with growing cyberwarfare attacks on Britain by foreign governments, particularly Russia and China.

A confidential document circulating in Whitehall says that while BT has taken steps to reduce the risk of attacks by hackers or organised crime, “we believe that the mitigating measures are not effective against deliberate attack by China”.

It is understood that Alex Allan, chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), briefed members of the ministerial committee on national security about the threat from China at a top-secret Whitehall meeting in January.

According to Whitehall sources, the meeting, led by Jacqui Smith, the home secretary, heard that ministers had “not paid sufficient attention to the threat in the past”, despite repeated warnings from the intelligence services. These included warnings from the security arm of GCHQ, which expressed concern because government departments, the intelligence services and the military will all use the new BT network.

A Whitehall report is understood to warn that, although there is at present a “low” risk of China exploiting its capability, “the impact would be very high”.

Huawei was allegedly founded with significant funding from the Chinese state. Its head is Ren Zhengfei, a former director of the telecoms research arm of the 3m-strong People’s Liberation Army.

The company is providing key components for BT’s new £10 billion network, which will update the UK’s telecoms with the use of internet technology. The report says the potential threat from Huawei “has been demonstrated elsewhere in the world”.

The multi-million-pound deal, signed in 2005, has led to a string of risk warnings from the intelligence and security services, with officials complaining of the failure of ministers to take them seriously.

It is unclear whether Patricia Hewitt, then trade and industry secretary, was warned of the problems when the deal was agreed in April 2005. However, the British company Marconi, which failed to win the contract in the face of a far cheaper offer from Huawei, did ask her to intervene to protect British jobs.

Hewitt, now a nonexecutive director of BT, declined to intervene, saying it was “a competitive tender between two commercial companies”. The most recent warnings about the cyberthreat to Britain’s security came in the JIC report on UK cybersecurity circulated in January and a Cabinet Office briefing paper that is understood to have emphasised Huawei’s links to the Chinese military.

Despite Allan’s warnings, and repeated warnings in the past, ministers remain reluctant to fund any move to remove the threat, officials say.

Yvette Cooper, chief secretary to the Treasury, is understood to have cautioned that it would be difficult to find the necessary funds in the current downturn. Ministers expressed concern that replacing the Chinese components with British parts would clash with government policy on competition.

According to the sources, the ministerial committee on national security was told at theJanuary meeting that Huawei components that form key parts of BT’s new network might already contain malicious elements waiting to be activated by China.

Working through Huawei, China was already equipped to make “covert modifications” or to “compromise equipment in ways that are very hard to detect” and that might later “remotely disrupt or even permanently disable the network”, the meeting was told.

This would be likely to have a “significant impact on critical services” such as power and water supplies, food distribution, the financial system and transport, which were dependent on computers to operate.

While technical modifications suggested to BT reduced the threat from hackers, organised criminals and most “hostile adversaries”, they were “not effective against deliberate attack from China”. The current friendly relations between Britain and China meant there was no immediate threat of this happening but there was still a very real threat that “covert functionality” within the components was already being used to gather intelligence.

Intelligence chiefs are believed to have warned that it was impossible to say if such information-gathering had already been introduced, since they had “only limited understanding of our adversaries’ attack capability”.

Whitehall departments were reportedly targeted by the Chinese in 2007, and a few months later Jonathan Evans, the MI5 director-general, wrote to 300 chief executives warning them that the Chinese were hacking into their systems and stealing confidential information.

An attempt by Huawei to merge with the US company 3Com, which provides computer security systems for thePentagon, was blocked last year after US intelligence warned that it would not be in US national security interests. In a new-year e-mail, Sun Yafang, Huawei’s chairwoman, told the company’s 85,000 employees that the global economic situation offered “both challenges and opportunities”. Four weeks later she was inside Downing Street as Gordon Brown welcomed Wen Jiabao, the Chinese premier.

Both Wen and Sun were keen to promote Huawei, which in little more than 20 years has grown into one of the world’s most powerful companies, with projected sales this year of £21 billion. Last year its sales jumped 46%. Its tentacles have reached most of the world’s telecoms companies.

Four days before Brown met Sun, intelligence chiefs had warned ministers of fears that Huawei’s role in the new system might have given China the ability to shut down Britain. Nor was it the first warning. Members of the ministerial committee on national security were told that “ministers had not paid sufficient attention to the threat from Huawei”.

John Tindle, professor in telecommunications engineering at Sunderland University, said software or hardware could sit hidden in a network, waiting to be activated. “If an unauthorised person were able to gain control of the equipment, its mode of operation could be changed,” he said. “The ability to move traffic across the network could be switched off. Traffic could be re-routed to another node controlled by the attacker.”

Huawei was selected to provide key components for the BT network in April 2005 despite allegations that it was bank-rolled by the Chinese government. The firm has previously shown itself to be opportunistic. The US company Cisco, one of Huawei’s main rivals, sued the Chinese company for alleged theft of its intellectual property rights in 2003. The case was settled out of court.

It is Huawei’s links to the Chinese military that cause most concern. Ren set up the company in 1988 after an edict from Deng Xiaoping, then China’s leader, that the country’s defence industry turn itself into profitable companies able to acquire modern technology.

A Pentagon report last week cited Huawei as a key part of the cyberthreat from China, noting that it retained “close ties” with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Huawei denies any continuing links to the PLA. A spokeswoman at the company’s UK headquarters dismissed the alleged links as “rumour and speculation”.

Cyberspace targets

Chinese hackers have repeatedly targeted western networks

-Computers at the Foreign Office and other Whitehall departments were attacked from China in 2007. In the same year, Jonathan Evans, the MI5 director-general, warned 300 British businesses that they were under Chinese cyber-attack

-The People’s Liberation Army is reputed to hold an annual competition to recruit the country’s best hackers

-Two years ago, Chinese Trojan horse spyware was found in the offices of Angela Merkel, the German chancellor

This article can be found at:

[here is an example of a commercial outfit that produces such weapons of cyber-terror – 800]

Companies target overload cyber-attacks
Israel 21c

December 03, 2001

Tel Aviv-based WanWall is preparing to commercially launch the first comprehensive solution for what is potentially the most dangerous weapon in the arsenals of cyber-terrorists – the massive distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks that flood a victim’s Internet server with huge amounts of traffic, overloading the system and causing the site to essentially crash.

In February 2000 such attacks crippled the networks of Yahoo, Ebay and, knocking these e-commerce giants offline for as long as several days, resulting in an estimated $1.2 billion in losses. More recently – and much more ominously – similar attacks have were used to paralyze NATO computers in protest against the bombing of Serbia, and key Indian government Web sites to promote Kashmiri separatist goals.

While attacks against commercial Web sites may seem like a mere nuisance, in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the DDOS threat has government officials concerned. A Pentagon advisory commission on terrorist threats faced by the U.S. said in recent report that the nation “must improve security against cyber attacks and enhance related critical infrastructure protection to ensure the security of essential government, financial, energy, and other critical sector operations against attack.”

The FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection Center, which on Nov. 2 issued a formal warning about the likelihood of new DDOS attacks, said in an October report that, “cyber protesters are becoming increasingly more organized and their techniques more sophisticated.”

The threat is so real that the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Pentagon’s technology development organization, has solicited companies to present their technologies at a December conference devoted solely to the threat of, and potential solutions to, DDOS attacks.

Companies and government institutions currently rely on a hodgepodge of anti-virus software, firewalls and other Internet security devices to respond to DDOS attacks. That’s about to change, though, as WanWall readies its suite of products that are designed specifically to protect routers and application servers from extreme overload conditions in wide-area networks (WANs).

In addition to government agencies, the products are targeted at Internet Service Providers (ISPs), Web-hosting companies, large enterprises and cellular telephone providers. Taken together, these represent an extremely attractive market opportunity for WanWall and other companies developing anti-DDOS solutions. According to a recent study by technology research firm IDC, the total DDOS prevention market will grow to over $800 million by 2005.

“We are ready with the right product just as the need for it increases significantly,” WanWall CEO Yuval Rachmilevitz said of the heightened awareness of the cyber-terrorist threat.

WanWall’s products are unique in that they divert the “bad” traffic away from a victim’s network while allowing legitimate traffic to reach the site. In addition, the key components of the system are not part of the network’s “critical path” and therefore do not degrade the normal operation of the network. Rather, when an attack is detected, the system automatically offloads the victim’s traffic from the network, cleans it, and then returns the clean traffic to the network, on its way to the intended destination.

For example, an attack on one ISP client has no impact on any others. In addition, WanWall’s solution is the only one capable of protecting ISPs’ and carriers’ networks from all known attacks, with minimal requirements from the network.

“The key idea of the system is not to add another device on the path, but rather to divert attack traffic away from it,” said Rachmilevitz.

The company, which was founded in 2000 by a team of top computer scientists from the Israeli academia and executives from some of Israel’s top technology companies, has significant backing from major venture capital firms, including Intel Capital and Israel’s Gemini Capital and Koor CVC. With these heavyweights in its corner, WanWall has the financial resources to see itself through and beyond the March 2002 release of its first products, and its first anticipated revenues.

This article can be found at:^l43&enPage=BlankPage&enDisplay=view&enDispWhat=object&enVersion=0&enZone=Technology&

Israeli cyber-Spies Penetrated Electricity Grid in U.S. and blame it on China & Russia

Mossad’s Nazi-Crypto-Jew, The Movie

Posted in Etc. with tags , , on March 28, 2009 by The 800 Pound Gorilla
June 18, 2007

When John Le Carré admitted several years ago he was a longtime agent of Britain’s intelligence services, the bestselling spy-thriller writer explained his involvement in the sort of terms you’d expect from someone who had for decades brilliantly captured boys’ spirits with a romanticized vision of espionage. “I really believed at last that I had found a cause I could serve,” Le Carré, then 69, said in a TV documentary, The Secret Centre. “I also longed for the dignity which great secrecy confers upon you.”

If great secrecy can confer dignity, it can also reap a personal harvest of great emotional wreckage. Such is the lesson of The Champagne Spy, a new documentary about one of the Mossad’s most infamous operations.

The setting is the Middle East in the early 1960s. Egypt’s ambitious leader Gamal Abdel Nasser is luring Nazi scientists to Cairo to facilitate the tyrant’s desire to build a nuclear weapon’s program. At around the same time, a dashing millionaire playboy named Wolfgang Lotz (rumored to be an ex-SS officer) arrives in Egypt and sets up a riding school and horse farm that quickly becomes the social nexus of both Egypt’s elite and their new Nazi imports.

Lotz’s real name is Major Ze’ev Gur Arie. He’s a Mossad recruit who was commander of an Israeli infantry company in the 1956 Sinai campaign. Arie’s covert identity – which gives him access to a tantalizing mix of women, wealth and intrigue – proves intoxicating, and ultimately, tragic for the Israeli wife and child he left behind.

That child, Oded Arie, finally chose to share his story (and never-before-seen family footage) with filmmaker Nadav Schirman, whose documentary is winning awards and impressing audiences on the film festival circuit.

I interviewed Nadav (a friend I met years ago during my stint at the Jerusalem Post) as he was getting ready to fly to California for the Los Angeles International Film Festival.

Did you grow up in a family with secrets?

If there were secrets they were well-kept.

I ask because for all the dramatic exceptionalism of the story, all the elements that might appeal to a spy fanboy’s doofus wonderment, Wolfgang Lutz seems emblematic of a certain segment of the post-holocaust generation, particularly those from Israel – the dysfunction borne out of a festering underbelly of familial secrets and suppressed memories, men of great resource simultaneously crippled by their unaddressed emotions, women forced into great sacrifices in the name of country and children, and so on.

For Lotz, it was even worse than what you describe. He was born in Germany in 1921. His father was a gentile, a theatre director, his mother a Jewish actress. As Hitler seized power in 1933, Lotz’s father killed himself and the desperate mother emigrated to Palestine with her son.

She dumped her son in a boarding school (Ben Shemen, with Peres and such) and tried her luck on the Habima stages. An utter narcissist obsessed with her interrupted acting career, she rarely visited him. That’s when he started to love horses.

Lotz, a German immigrant, was never quite totally a Sabra (native Israeli). His friends in the Hagana didn’t trust him completelyhe seemed like an outsider with his Aryan looks, European demeanor and German-tinged accent. That’s maybe why his military career stalled and he left the army at 40, frustrated and of course ripe for the Mossad boys to snatch him up.

Speaking of the damage secrets can wreak, you screened this in front of a group of Mossad agents. Describe to me what happened. It must’ve been fascinating to see their reactions.

No secrets: SchirmanWe screened the film, and afterwards I sat on a panel with the former Mossad psychologist whose job was to evaluate candidates and also treat all psychological hardships that come with the jobthe loneliness, the shock of alternating identities and returning home after a mission.

Imagine, you’ve been 5 years undercover, with an unlimited expense account, living high on adrenaline and adventure. Then, suddenly, you’re in a small Tel Aviv apartment and your wife is screaming at you to change the diapers. It’s a tough transition. In the movie, you see how Lotz did not handle the transition well and suffered a tragic end.

It’s hard to fathom the lives these people lead. On the panel, there was also a former agent who was captured in Iraq, tortured and imprisoned for 10 years. He talked about how it’s really true that everyone talks in the end. He said that the decisive moment during his interrogation and torture was when the Iraqis staged his hanging. They forced him to stand on a stool with a noose around his neck for 20 minutes. He thought he was going to die; he had already made his peace. That’s just a crazy situation.

At the premiere screenings in March at the DocAviFilm Festival in Tel Aviv, about a quarter of the audience was Mossad or former “Office” (that’s how they call it, “the Office”). After the panel, on my way out, I was accosted by dozens of former agents who all wanted to thank me for the film. They were open and talkative, going against everything that governs their professional life. The agents’ responses to the film were touching. It gives them a chance to talk about their bottled up emotions, discuss the personal price they paid for their service.

Jews developed a mythology about the “elite” status of certain Israeli institutions. After being herded en masse to our extermination like helpless kittens, it was a comforting, even necessary, delusion to think of, say, the IDF as invincible or the Mossad as an almost-supernatural gang of Jewish James Bonds. I, personally, reveled in the aggrandizement as a child, reading every military book, listening to every magnificent tale of heroism told by my father and his friends. And I believe it made me stronger, prouder, more confident than my American Jewish peers raised on the nebbishness of Woody Allen.

The deconstruction of those mythologies at the hands of post-Zionist literature, the latest Lebanese war, and movies like yours is a difficult phenomenon to assess. On a nostalgic, personal level I fear what it means for Israel. I’m not suggesting these stories not be told, that agitprop and myth win out over truth. It is healthy, a sign of maturation. What I’m curious about is how it affected you personally. Was it emotional knowing you were part of this effort at deconstruction? Do you think the mythology is indeed dead, and is that a good thing?

Go down, Wolfgang: Arie posing as Lotz in EgyptGood question! I approached the whole spy thing impregnated with James Bond impressions, too. I mean I always dreamt of being a spy. I grew up all over the world. My dad was a diplomat, and as a kid, we went to all these cocktail parties and embassy functions, which where fertile ground for my fantasies.

What I discovered through the making of the film is two things. One, as you can see from Lotz’s story, being an agent is a lonely and confusing job at best. The excitement, adrenaline and glamorous lifestyle seem now to be a thin veil for the grey and lonely work of information gathering. The second thing, which even took me by surprise, is that the Mossad peopleall those around Lotz’s operational unit who I’ve metare like a family. They were once a bunch of idealistic, kind, good hearted Zionists who’ve slowly and sadly become realists. I wish they ran the country.

These are the people who built the myth with their own hands and laid the foundation for Israel. I discovered that what they had and my generation lacks: blind faith and real heartfelt patriotism. Everything has changed. Patriotism has morphed into individualism and opportunism. We have always wanted to be, after all, a Western country. Today you can apply to “the Office” via the web. Just send in your resume. That’s says a lot about what changed. But so should it ? No? Who knows?

Sounds like you’re not terribly optimistic about the changes that have taken place.

Real love for your country is hard to replace. Sitting in his olive grove near Rishon Le’Tzion, I talked to Jacob Nachmias, Lotz’s former Paris operative. We were under the olive trees that his father had planted in the 1920s when it was just fields all around. Jacob fought in every single Israeli war since 1948, climbing in rank, then specializing in intelligence, and eventually dedicating his life to the country he had helped build. For a moment, talking to him, I really felt close to him, to the land, and to a history that part of my lineage as an Israeli.

And then I left Nachmias’s grove, and where there were once fields, there are now highways, industrial parks, shopping malls, noise, pollution.

There is a wrenching moment in the film when Oded passes summary judgment on his father’s life with the chilling words, “He hurt everyone close to him.” In the movie Munich, Steven Spielberg used the emotional price paid by the Israeli agents as a way to deliver a political message about violence’s ceaseless cycle. Is there a message you’re trying to deliver?

No message except for the one that each person takes home with him. I hope never to be as didactic in my filmmaking as you suggest. A film is more of an exploration, a window onto another world.

How did you find the project?

The project found me. As always, no?

A friend gave me an old book, The Champagne Spy, which we’re actually now adapting into a feature screenplay. Anyway, it was Lotz’s exploits in Cairo written by himself. Just the name of the author turned me on: Wolfgang Lotz! What a name! After reading it, I said “This can’t be true. The man was a real life James Bond: Cairo, horses, parties, women, missiles in the desert…”

Spy kid: Oded Arie and his dadI tried to get the rights but all the publishers told me the same thing: “Rights reverted to author; author dead; your problem.”

Then one day, I’m sitting next to the pool where my son is taking swimming lessons. Next to me, there’s an older man and he asks me what I do. I tell him I’m trying to make a film about Wolfgang Lotz.

“Oh yeah?” The old man perks up. “How’s it going?”

Not good, I said. The man is dead and I can’t find any family he may have left.

“Maybe I can help you,” he says. I give him my number, not really thinking much of it.

Then, two weeks later I get a phone call from the man. He said: “The man you’re trying to find is Oded Gur Arie. He’s Lotz’s son. He’s coming to Israel next week. His number is so and so.” Beeeep. He hangs up.

Then I met Oded, and he tells me his father told him he was a spy when Oded was only 12 and that he never told anyone that, or anything else about his experience, until today. And then! Then, Oded shows me the old 8 millimeter videos he had shot of his dad’s secret visits to Paris. That’s when I knew the film had chosen me.

Were there any negative reactions to the film in Israel?

Not yet. People love it here. The film is nominated for “Best Feature Documentary” in the Israeli Academy Awards and in the Israeli Documentary Forum.

Israeli film seems to be experiencing a golden moment. Any explanation?

Israeli films are winning major awards in every single festival this year (Berlin, Sundance, Tribeca, Cannes). I think the work of the Israeli Film Fund, the work of the three or four film schools and of the L.A.-Tel Aviv partnership programs are paying off. We’ve got a new generation of talent and it’s going to be exciting to see what will be produced in the next few years.

The above article can be found at: From Israel With Love

Also read

TIME magazine

November 23, 1970

The Champagne Spy
Egyptian generals and Cabinet members in the early 1960s knew Wolfgang Lotz as a wealthy German horse breeder with an engaging habit of sending champagne and other lavish gifts to well-placed friends. They thought of him as an ex-Wehrmacht captain in Rommel’s Afrika Korps who later made a fortune in Australia. Some whispered that he was actually a former lieutenant colonel in Hitler’s dread SS who had joined Egyptian intelligence.

To the astonishment of his Egyptian friends, the rusty-haired Lotz was disclosed in 1965 to be an Israeli spy. Lotz’s explanation was persuasive enough to save his life. He joined the Israelis, he said, because they had threatened to reveal his Nazi past to the Bonn authorities. Besides, there was the convincing detail that he was uncircumcised. The court let him off with a 25-year sentence, and only three years later Lotz and his German wife Waldrud were turned over to the Israelis in an exchange of prisoners. Along with nine Israeli captives, the Lotzes were swapped for more than 4,000 Egyptian prisoners, including nine generals.

Last week Israeli officials allowed the full extent of Lotz’s subterfuge to be revealed by official sources for the first time. Far from being an ex-Nazi soldier, Lotz was a Jew, an Israeli citizen and an officer of Israel’s army. He was born in Germany in 1921, to be sure, but emigrated to Palestine with his Jewish mother in 1933. He later spent seven years in the British army (including four in Egypt, where he learned fluent Arabic). He served in the Sinai campaign of 1956 as the commander of an Israeli infantry company.

Radio in a Boot. In 1960, Lotz turned up in West Berlin, where he applied for and received West German citizenship. A year later, he arrived in Egypt, set up a riding school and horse farm, and began impressing important people by giving away tape recorders and cameras, refrigerators and washing machines.

Through his new friends in the Gezira Sporting Club, Lotz was able to set up a stable in the Abassiye Garrison and get a permanent pass to the camp. Later he trained his horses at a practice race track beside the armor depot near Heliopolis. All the while, he was relaying his gleanings back to Israel on a tiny transmitter he kept in a riding boot. Through German friends, he established that Egyptian rockets were not an immediate menace because their guidance systems were unreliable. He also learned that the Egyptians’ HA-300 jet interceptor­a great worry to the Israelis at the time­was a dud.

Lotz’s greatest accomplishment was his verification that the Shaloufa rocket site, near Great Bitter Lake on the Suez Canal, was a genuine base and not a dummy. Posing as tourists on a fishing trip, the Lotzes drove toward the camp and managed to get themselves arrested. “I was afraid they would simply send us away,” says Lotz. “Fortunately, they took us straight into the base.” Once there, Lotz talked the commandant into calling his old friend Brigadier General Fuad Osman, a highly placed Egyptian intelligence officer. The conversation, as Lotz recalls it:

Osman: Rusty, do you want to rot in jail, or will you pay up with a bottle of champagne?

Lotz: Egyptian or French?

Osman: Now don’t act like a Jew. French champagne, of course.

As Lotz entered a party a few days later, the brigadier shouted: “Here comes the Israeli spy who tried to get into our rocket base.” Everyone laughed, including Lotz. He had already reported to his Israeli colleagues­who still refer to him as “the champagne spy”­that the Shaloufa base was being made ready for Soviet missiles.

In 1965 the Egyptians rounded up a number of West Germans as a precautionary measure before a visit by East German Boss Walter Ulbricht. When the police searched Lotz’s home, they discovered that he had been spying for the Israelis. Since the 1968 prisoner exchange, Lotz has lived modestly in Tel Aviv as an Israeli air force major. He has grown paunchy despite his daily riding, and sometimes admits that he misses the high life in Cairo.

The above article can be found at: The Champagne Spy

Mossad’s Nazi-Crypto-Jew, The Movie

Israeli “telecom” front ops penetrate Montreal metro

Posted in Mossad's 9/11 with tags , , , , , on March 15, 2009 by The 800 Pound Gorilla

mtro215x281yi3The “mainstream” (i.e., Zionist-controlled) media can no longer be trusted to provide anything in the way of truthful news reporting. Under such circumstances, all genuine investigative journalism must inevitably fall to independent researchers and/or concerned citizens.

“Montreal: The Next Terrorist Target?” is an excellent example of just the sort of independent research/activism needed to implicate the Zionist crime network now at work in our major cities. In this obscure-but-excellent 2007 documentary, 9/11 truther Micheal Pengue asks all the right questions and quickly connects the dots, revealing the long reach of Israeli intelligence — by way of now-familiar Mossad telecom front companies Comverse, Verint and Odigo — into his home city of Montreal.

Download it here , watch it, then pass it along to every thinking person you know (especially Canadians!).

The hour-long film reveals how, in 2003, Montreal municipal officials awarded telecommunications firm Verint the contract to provide video surveillance of Montreal’s mass transit system. Although officials at first deny the existence of the contract — documented evidence for which is provided by the filmmaker — they later admit that Verint was, in fact, given a contract to install hundreds of surveillance cameras throughout the Montreal metro system.

The documentary then points out Verint’s intimate relationship to other “multinational” telecoms, known to be fronts for Israeli intelligence. Along with Verint itself, these include Verint’s parent-company Comverse (the founder of which, Jacob Alexander, is a former Israeli intelligence officer), Amdocs and Odigo — names which should now be familiar to all serious 9/11 researchers.

Drawing on the infamous 2001 Fox News report on Israeli spying on the U.S. , Pengue goes on to explain these companies’ dubious connections to both 9/11 and the 7/7 attacks in London. (For further information on the links between Israeli intelligence — and its fleet of “telecom” fronts — to both false-flag operations, see Victor Thorn’s “9/11 Evil: Israel’s Central Role in the Sept. 11 Attacks”.)

The information and analysis provided in this well-sourced documentary constitute further evidence implicating the Zionist crime network and revealing the long reach of its global espionage operations. But it also raises a more immediate concern — are the same forces at work in the mass transit system of your city?

“Montreal: The Next Terrorist Target?” by Micheal Pengue — download it here , watch it, then pass it on to every thinking person you know.

Israeli “telecom” front ops penetrate Montreal metro